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The	Agrarian	Question	and	Food	Sovereignty	
Movements:	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	Capitalism,	
the	State,	and	‘Peasant’	Class	Dynamics	in	Bolivia	and	
Nepal	
Mark	Tilzey	
	
Abstract				
	Beginning	 in	 the	 1990s,	many	 states	 in	 the	 global	 South	 experienced	 a	 ‘second	
wave’	of	popular	protests,	ostensibly	against	neoliberal	policies	deriving	from	the	
global	Northern	imperium,	but	actually	directed	in	a	more	profound	sense	against	
long-standing	 social	 inequities	 and	 political	 marginalization	 arising	 from	
entrenched	 oligarchical	 power	 and	 failed	 ‘pro-peasant’	 agrarian	 reforms	 at	 the	
level	 of	 the	 state	 (albeit	 situated	 within	 the	 international	 context	 of	 ‘centre-
periphery’	relations).	What	was	distinctive	about	these	protests	was	their	broadly	
agrarian	 character	 and	 their	 ‘peasant’,	 and	 frequently	 indigenous,	 complexion.	
While	 re-affirming	 the	 anti-imperialism	 and	 national	 sovereignty	 claims	 of	 the	
‘first	 wave’	 of	 anti-neoliberal	 protests	 of	 the	 1980s,	 the	 ‘second	 wave’	 was	
remarkable	 for	 its	 articulation	 and	 valorization,	 in	 opposition	 inter	 alia	 to	 both	
‘orthodox’	neoclassical	 ‘developmentalism’	and	‘progressivist’	Marxism,	of	a	pro-
peasant	positionality,	often	 in	 combination	with	a	new	concern	with	 indigenous	
and	 gender	 rights,	 and	 environmental	 sustainability.	 	 These	 protests	 suggested	
that	 the	agrarian	question	was	 far	 from	dead,	and	 that	 rumours	 to	 the	contrary	
were	premature	 if	 the	peasant	protagonists	 themselves	were	to	have	any	say	 in	
the	matter.	These	agrarian-based	protests	often	coalesced	around	 the	notion	of	
food	 sovereignty,	 and	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 new	millennium	 witnessed	 some	
remarkable	 political	 gains	 both	 nationally	 and	 internationally,	 the	 latter	 often	
propelled	 through	 the	 new	 global	 network	 of	 ‘peasant’	 organizations,	 La	 Via	
Campesina.	 Perhaps	 the	 most	 remarkable	 political	 successes,	 however,	
particularly	given	the	near	universal	dominance	of	neoliberalism	until	the	turn	of	
the	millennium,	have	occurred	at	national	 level	with	the	election	of	a	significant	
number	of	left-leaning	regimes	and	the	adoption	in	their	new	or	interim	national	
constitutions	 of	 formal	 commitments	 to	 food	 sovereignty.	 Since	 about	 2010,	
however,	 a	 common	 trend	 in	 these	 states	 has	 been	 a	 disappointing	 lack	 of	
progress	 in	the	translation	of	such	formal	commitments	 into	substantive	policies	
and	change	‘on	the	ground’.	The	states	that	broadly	embody	these	trends	include	
Bolivia,	Ecuador,	Nicaragua,	and	Venezuela	in	Latin	America,	and	Nepal	in	Asia.		
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2	
Introduction	
The	current	paper,	taking	two	of	these	states	–	Bolivia	and	Nepal	–	as	case	studies,	
seeks	 both	 to	 understand	 the	 key	 dynamics	 of	 this	 remarkable	 phenomenon	 of	
‘peasant’	protest	movements	against	a	backdrop	of	neoliberal	globalization,	and	
to	delineate	salient	lessons	from	it	as	we	enter	a	period	of	deepening	economic,	
political,	 and	 agricultural/ecological	 contradictions	 both	 of	 and	 for	 global	 and	
national	capitalisms.	Specifically,	the	paper	seeks	to	understand:	
• The	 political	 economic	 (and	 ecological)	 basis	 of	 these	 ‘peasant’	 protest	
movements;	
• The	 reasons	 for	 their	 selective	 political	 success	 embodied	 particularly	 in	
the	constitutionalization	of	food	sovereignty;	
• The	 reasons	 for	 the	 general	 failure	 substantively	 to	 build	 on	 these	
successes	 in	 the	period	since	2010	by	 reference	 to	 the	 interplay	of	 class,	
state,	and	capitalist	dynamics;	
• Whether	 the	 original	 aims	 and	 objectives	 of	 these	 protest	 movements	
remain	 relevant	 and	 feasible	 today,	 and	 if	 so,	 how,	 politically	 and	 agro-
ecologically,	they	might	be	revived	and	(re)-enacted.		
	
Contextualizing	the	Agrarian	Question:	Capitalism,	the	State,	and	
‘Peasant’	Resistance	
The	conventional	wisdom	of	 the	 last	quarter	century	has	been	that	 the	agrarian	
question	 is	a	 thing	of	 the	past	and	 that	 somehow,	within	 the	hubristic	milieu	of	
late	capitalism,	we	have	been	liberated	from	the	constraints	of	agriculture,	 land,	
and	 nature.	 Such	 a	 position	 is	 common	 to	 both	 orthodox,	 neoclassical	
developmentalism	and	‘progressivist’	Marxism.	The	premise	underlying	this	paper,	
however,	is	that	the	agrarian	question,	far	from	being	dead,	is	arguably	the	most	
fundamental	question	of	 the	21st	 century.	 Indeed,	 this	 is	 the	 century,	we	would	
suggest,	 in	 which	 the	 current	 system	 of	 trans-nationalizing	 capitalism	 and	
imperialism,	and	the	neoliberal	food	regime	which	forms	an	intrinsic	part	of	it,	are	
likely	 to	 reach	 their	 reproductive	 limits	 across	 both	 ‘political’	 and	 ‘biophysical’	
dimensions	 (Tilzey	 2016a).	 In	 response	 to	 the	 growing	 contradictions	of	 and	 for	
capitalism	 (ibid.),	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 predatory	 character	 of	monopoly-finance	
capital	 and	 the	 ‘new	 imperialism’	 that	 now	 characterizes	North-South	 relations,	
there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 renewed	 imperative	 to	wrest	 control	 of	 global	 agriculture,	
land,	and	other	natural	 resources	 from	these	class	 forces	and	place	 them	 in	 the	
hands	of	the	‘wretched	of	the	Earth’	for	the	purposes	of	autonomous,	egalitarian,	
democratic,	and	ecologically	sustainable	development.		
In	 order	 better	 to	 understand	 the	 current	 conjuncture,	 comprising	 the	
contradictory	 nature	 of	 globalizing	 capitalism	 and	 its	 state-level	 variations	 and	
mediations,	as	providing	the	generalized,	‘structural’	backdrop	to	the	emergence	
of	 peripheral	 ‘peasant’	 protest,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 survey,	 necessarily	 briefly,	 the	
emergence	and	evolution	of	the	agrarian	question	from	its	first	explicit	intellectual	
formulation	 towards	 the	 close	 of	 the	 19th	 century.	 Following	 this	 ‘classical’	
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3	
formulation	 of	 the	 agrarian	 question	 in	 Europe	 by	 Kautsky	 (1899),	 the	
‘peripheries’	 of	 the	 global	 capitalist	 system	 received	 relatively	 little	 analytical	
attention	 from	 Marxist	 theorists.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 process	 of	 European	 and	
subsequently	North	American	and	Japanese	imperial	expansion	would	inspire	the	
basis	 of	 a	 new	 critique	 emanating	 from	 responsive	 nationalistic	 and	 communist	
movements	 in	the	‘periphery’,	 for	which	the	militarized	‘enclosure’	of	the	world,	
through	 land	 alienation,	 forced	 production	 for	 export,	 the	 pillaging	 of	 mineral	
resources,	and	racial	domination,	became	priority	concerns.	In	due	course,	these	
movements	would	condense	and	transform	the	‘classical’	agrarian	question	into	a	
project	of	national	liberation,	now	seen,	however,	as	more	than	a	mere	means	of	
industrial	development,	productivist	agriculture,	and	proletarianization	of	the	bulk	
of	 the	 peasantry	 as	 propounded	 by	 bourgeois	 and	 orthodox	 socialist	 theorists	
alike.	 The	 agrarian	 question	 in	 the	 ‘periphery’	 would	 thus	 become	 intrinsically	
linked	 to	 the	 realization	of	national	 independence.	As	we	 shall	 see,	 the	 issue	of	
whether	the	‘national’	question	is	framed	in	sub-hegemonic	(capitalist)	reformist	
terms,	or	in	counter-hegemonic	(anti-capitalist)	revolutionary	terms,	seems	to	be	
crucial	 to	 the	 resolution	 of	 the	 agrarian	 question	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 global	
‘dispossessed’.	
The	 turning	 point	 in	 nationalist	 struggles	 was	 the	 victory	 of	 the	 Chinese	
communists,	 the	Maoist	 vision	 of	 which	 eliminated	 ‘conservative’	 forces	 in	 the	
countryside	and	set	in	motion	an	autonomous	development	programme.	Here,	its	
historic	contribution	to	the	agrarian	question	was	the	re-articulation	of	the	home	
economy	 free	 from	 imperial	 intervention	 in	 a	way	 that	would	 seek	 to	maintain	
rural-urban	political	unity	and	inter-sectoral	balance,	all	within	a	self-financed	and	
rural-based	industrial	transformation.	As	we	shall	see,	this	was	a	vision	that	would	
strongly	inform	the	‘peasant’	mobilizations	in	Nepal	from	the	1990s.		
In	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 periphery,	 however,	 a	 variety	 of	 transitions	 was	
implemented	generally	without	major	structural	reforms,	particularly	land	reform.	
With	 few	 exceptions,	 the	 large	 majority	 of	 peripheral	 states	 evaded	 industrial	
transition	 altogether,	 remaining	 agrarian,	 wholly	 disarticulated	 and	 perpetually	
subordinate	to	imperial	capital	and	to	nationally-based	comprador	classes	(landed	
oligarchy	and	comprador	bourgeoisie)	 (de	 Janvry	1981).	 The	 imperium,	with	 the	
collaboration	of	these	classes,	engineered	a	new	international	division	of	labour	in	
agriculture,	 marked	 by	 unprecedented	 food	 dependence	 in	 the	 South.	 The	
periphery	entered	a	serious	agrarian	crisis	 in	 the	1960s	as	a	consequence	of	 the	
socially	 polarizing	 consequences	 of	 the	 ‘green	 revolution’,	 the	 exodus	 to	 urban	
centres	of	marginalized	peasantry,	and	enhanced	debt	crisis.	It	was	accompanied	
by	a	wave	of	mass	mobilizations,	culminating	either	in	new	revolutionary	ruptures	
by	peasant	guerilla	forces	(Vietnam,	Cuba,	Angola,	Mozambique)	(Wolf	1969),	or	
military	 coups	 under	 the	 aegis	 of	 the	 global	Northern	 imperium	 (Latin	America,	
Congo,	Ghana,	the	Arab	world).	Imperialism,	however,	was	at	this	juncture	forced	
temporarily	 into	 retreat.	 Continuing	 dependency	 notwithstanding,	 imperialism	
acquiesced	 to	 the	expansion	of	political	 sovereignty	 to	 the	South	and	 to	 limited	
experimentation	 with	 ‘articulated’	 development	 as	 a	 social	 bulwark	 against	
further	revolutionary	upheaval.		
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4	
This	 interlude	 of	 ‘benign’	 imperialism	 and	 relative	 in-dependence	 for	 the	
periphery	 lasted	only	until	 the	 late	1970s,	however.	At	 this	point,	 the	neoliberal	
project	was	launched	by	the	imperial	North,	a	strategy	to	recuperate	monopolistic	
profits	 and	 stave	 off	 an	 emergent	 South.	 In	 so	 doing,	 the	 project	 abandoned	
whatever	 incipient	 policy	 commitment	 to	 ‘articulated’	 development	 had	
previously	existed.	Neoliberalism	heralded	not	the	‘end’	of	the	agrarian	question,	
but	rather	the	re-launching	of	the	agrarian	question	of	monopoly-finance	capital.	
Through	 the	 instrument	 of	 debt	 leverage,	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 global	 South	 was	
gradually	 re-opened	 and	 placed	 at	 the	 disposal	 of	 trans-nationalizing	 capital.	
‘Disarticulated’	development	re-asserted	itself,	with	conservative	forces,	the	agro-
exporting	 oligarchies	 that	 had	 been	 reluctant	 adherents	 to	 ISI	 and	 land	 reform	
during	the	‘in-dependence’	interlude,	now	benefitting	from	the	new	dependency.	
Thus,	 the	 highly	 indebted	 peripheral	 and	 semi-peripheral	 states	 in	 which	 these	
class	 forces	 predominated	 (counterposed	 to	 a	 burgeoning	 class	 of	 semi-
proletarian	‘peasantry’)	were	‘forced’	(or,	from	the	oligarchies’	perspective,	were	
happy)	 to	 lift	 state	 controls	 on	 currencies,	 prices,	 capital	 and	 trade,	 roll	 back	
industrial	 policies,	 privatize	 public	 enterprises	 and	 retreat	 to	 the	 export	 of	 cash	
crops	 and	 minerals	 as	 a	 means	 of	 servicing	 debt	 (and	 making	 profits	 for	 the	
oligarchies).	 This	 trend	 received	 further	 reinforcement	 with	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	
Soviet	bloc	in	the	late	1980s,	and	the	1990s	became	a	decade	of	almost	unbridled	
neoliberalism.		
The	 result	 of	 this	 resurgence	of	 neoliberal	 and	monopoly-finance	 capital	was	 to	
shift	 once	 again	 the	 coordinates	of	 the	 agrarian	question.	 The	 rural	 exodus	 and	
semi-proletarianization	 of	 the	 peasantry	 continued	 unabated,	 but	 without	
absorption	 of	 the	 (part)-expelled	 workforce	 into	 industrial	 employment	 as	 was	
supposed	 to	 happen	 in	 a	 ‘classic’	 agrarian	 transition	 to	 capitalism.	 Agro-export	
capital	 continued	 to	 marginalize	 the	 peasantry,	 while	 national	 industries	
collapsed.	 This	 new	 ‘precarious’	 workforce	 has	 remained	 to	 this	 day	 insecurely	
employed,	 under-employed,	 or	 unemployed	 (manifested	 most	 obviously	 in	 the	
‘informal’	 economy),	 in	 constant	 flux	 between	 town	 and	 country,	 and	 across	
international	borders	(growth	of	the	remittance	economy).	Instead	of	the	classical	
dichotomy	between	‘peasants’	(or	more	precisely	farmers)	and	‘workers’	seen	in	
‘articulated’	 development,	 and	 in	 transitions	 from	 the	 former	 to	 the	 latter,	 the	
phenomenon	 that	 has	 prevailed	 is	 that	 of	 permanent	 semi-proletarianization.	
Here	the	expelled,	the	partially	expelled,	and	super-exploited	workforce	competes	
with	those	in	relatively	secure	employment	to	drive	down	wages	across	the	board,	
delivering	super-profits	to	trans-national	capital.		
This	 phenomenon	 has	 been	 interpreted,	 by	 both	 orthodox	 ‘development’	
theorists	and	‘progressive’	Marxists	alike,	as	the	‘disappearance’	of	the	peasantry	
–	 for	 the	 latter,	 it	 is	 now	 simply	 an	 ‘agrarian	 question	 of	 labour’	 in	 which	 the	
‘peasantry’	merely	constitute	a	slightly	different	form	of	the	proletariat	(Bernstein	
2010).	 Nonetheless,	 members	 of	 the	 semi-proletariat	 themselves	 have	 never	
abandoned	 the	 agrarian	 question	 or	 the	 land	 question	 (de	 Janvry	 1981).	 The	
demand	 for	 land	 has	 expanded	 in	 rural	 areas,	 and	 it	 continues	 to	 be	 seen	 as	
fundamental	 to	 the	 reproduction	 of	 the	 household.	 Indeed,	 the	most	 politically	
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5	
significant	trend	over	the	last	two	or	three	decades	has	been	the	upsurge	in	land	
occupations	in	the	countryside	of	the	South.	This	politically	reflexive	response	by	
the	semi-proletariat	as	agent	has	placed	the	agrarian	question	on	the	agenda	as	
an	agrarian	question	of	land	access	and	of	rights	for	the	‘peasantry’.	So,	access	to	
land	 for	 the	 expelled	 or	 partially	 expelled	 is	 now	 also	 a	 question	 of	 regaining	
access	 to	 basic	 citizenship	 and	 social	 rights,	 or	 perhaps	 to	 claiming	 ‘real	
citizenship’	 beyond	 bourgeois	 superficialities	 that	 has	 never	 yet	 been	 their	 (see	
Mooers	2014,	Tilzey	2016b).			
We	are	currently	in	the	midst	of	a	monumental,	epochal	crisis	of	neoliberalism,	if	
not	yet	of	capitalism	in	general.	 Imperial	monopoly-finance	capital	has	escalated	
its	accumulation	of	land	and	natural	resources	in	the	peripheries,	yet	it	faces	three	
political	challenges	here	(to	say	nothing	of	longer	term	biophysical	constraints	to	
which	 these	 are,	 in	 varying	 degrees,	 conjoined).	 The	 first	 two	 represent	 sub-
hegemonic	 challenges	 to	 the	 hegemony	 of	 neoliberalism:	 firstly,	 the	 national	
sovereignty	 regime	 established	 in	 the	 20th	 century,	 although	 attenuated,	 is	
nonetheless	still	exercised	even	by	the	small	states;	secondly,	the	emerging	semi-
peripheries	 (the	 sub-imperium),	 the	 unintended	 consequence	 of	 globalization,	
which,	 although	 not	 radical	 in	 themselves,	 have	 created	 new	 spaces	 and	
opportunities	 for	manoeuvre	 by	 peripheral	 states.	 	 This	 sub-hegemonic	 trend	 is	
itself	 not	 without	 its	 own	 internal	 contradictions,	 these	 being	 intrinsic	 to	
capitalism	and	its	necessarily	state-based	form	(Tilzey	2016a).	Monopolistic	firms	
are	springing	up	in	the	sub-imperium	(China,	 India,	Brazil,	South	Africa,	etc.)	and	
scrambling	themselves	for	natural	resources,	land,	and	food	supplies.	Their	home	
states	may	not	be	militarizing	imperialism	in	the	manner	of	the	global	North,	and	
they	 do	 often	maintain	 a	 higher	 commitment	 to	 the	 sovereignty	 regime	 and	 to	
national	development.	Moreover,	the	economic	flows	ushered	in	across	the	South	
have	permitted	some	to	circumvent	the	Western	debt	trap,	as	with	the	‘pink	tide’	
states	 of	 Latin	 America.	 But	 all	 are,	 nonetheless,	 subject	 to	 the	 socially	 and	
ecologically	contradictory	dynamics	of	capitalism.	
The	 agrarian	 question	 now	 certainly	 remains	 a	 question	 of	 national	 sovereignty	
under	conditions	of	imperialism	and	sub-imperialism,	therefore.	But	there	is	also	
now	 a	 tension	 between	 national	 sovereignty	 as	 the	 ‘old’,	 reformist	 vision	 of	
articulated	 capitalist	 development	 (even	 as	 a	 means	 to	 socialism),	 on	 the	 one	
hand,	 and	 national	 sovereignty	 as	 a	 ‘new’,	 revolutionary,	 vision	 of	 pro-peasant,	
pro-environmental,	 and	 possibly	 post-developmental	 anti-capitalism,	 on	 the	
other.	It	is	the	latter	that	represents	the	third,	or	counter-hegemonic,	challenge	to	
neoliberalism.	 Questions	 of	 gender	 equity,	 indigenism,	 and	 ecological	
sustainability	are,	in	addition	to	class,	now	central	to	this	latter	vision.	The	political	
question	now	appears	to	be:	what	type	of	political	organization	can	attend	to	the	
semi-proletariat,	 not	 to	 transform	 it	 into	 a	 proletariat	 or	 a	 class	 of	 commercial	
farmers	in	a	full	transition	to	capitalism,	but	rather	to	re-valorize	its	identity	as	a	
peasantry	through	access	to	land	and	the	fulfilment	of	its	vocation	as	small-scale	
and	ecologically-based	providers	of	secure	food	supplies	for	themselves,	the	local	
community,	and	the	nation	–	in	short,	food	sovereignty.		
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6	
In	response	to	deepened	neoliberal	imperialism	and	a	resurgent	landed	oligarchy,	
the	 ‘peasantry’	 have,	 against	 all	 expectations	 and	 predictions	 of	 their	 demise,	
risen	 up.	 From	 the	 1990s,	 rural	 protest	 movements	 have	 proliferated	 in	 Latin	
America	 (Mexico,	 Brazil,	 Bolivia,	 Ecuador,	 Colombia),	 Africa	 (most	 notably	
Zimbabwe),	 and	 Asia	 (particularly	 Nepal,	 but	 also	 India,	 Philippines)	 to	 pursue	
none	other	than	the	recuperation	of	land	by	means	of	mass	occupations,	among	
other	 tactics.	 The	 environmental	 cause	 has	 become	 one	 of	 their	 priorities,	
particularly	 in	 Latin	 America,	 given	 that	 the	 destruction	 wrought	 by	 extractive	
capital	occurs	most	immediately	at	the	expense	of	marginalized	communities.	This	
explains,	 at	 least	 in	part,	why	 these	 rural	mobilizations	have	often	 incorporated	
indigenous	rights,	feminist,	and	environmental	movements.		
It	is	only	in	a	handful	of	cases,	however,	these	‘peasant’	protest	movements	have	
succeeded	 in	 gaining	 some	 political	 power	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 state	 (Bolivia,	
Ecuador,	Venezuela,	Zimbabwe,	Nepal)	and	have	been	able,	 inter	alia,	 to	 secure	
commitments	 in	 their	 respective	 national	 constitutions	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 food	
sovereignty.	In	most	cases,	even	here,	however,	such	access	to	the	state	has	been	
possible	only	through	fragile	alliances	with	an	emergent,	sub-hegemonic,	national	
and	 anti-imperialist	 bourgeoisie.	 This	 means	 that	 such	 alliances	 have,	 from	 the	
outset,	 tended	 to	compromise	and	subvert	 the	original	ambitions	of	 the	protest	
movement.	 While	 these	 national	 bourgeoisies,	 together	 crucially	 with	 a	 petty	
bourgeoisie	 of	 upper	 peasantry,	 still	 nurture	 visions	 of	 ‘articulated’	 capitalist	
development,	 (with	 the	 peasantry	 transformed	 into	 capitalist	 farmers	 and/or	 a	
fully	proletarianized	workforce),	the	(middle	and	lower)	peasantry	itself	seems	to	
have	other	ideas.	They	appear	to	be	proposing	an	alternative	society	which	takes	
seriously	 ‘re-peasantization’	 or	 re-agrarianization	 as	 a	modern	 project	 (although	
calling	strongly	on	traditions	drawn	from	the	past)	,	along	with	cooperative	forms	
of	 production	 and	 labour	 absorption.	 What	 appears	 perhaps	 most	 distinctive	
about	this	new	vision,	at	least	in	its	Latin	American	variant,	is	the	de-legitimation	
of	capitalism,	for	political,	cultural,	and	ecological	reasons,	both	as	an	end	in	itself	
and	as	a	putative	transitional	pathway	to	socialism.	
	
Key	Principles	Underlying	Capital-State-Class	Dynamics	of	the	
Agrarian	Question	
Implicit	in	this	characterization	of	the	agrarian	question	is	a	number	of	theoretical	
principles	 which	 enable	 us	 to	 understand	 its	 dynamics	 in	 general,	 and,	 in	
particular,	 to	 understand	why	 ‘counter-hegemonic’	 peasant	 protest	movements	
are	a	phenomenon	of	the	global	South.	The	first	general	principle	to	understand	is	
that	 capital-state	 dynamics	 are	 characterized	 not	 merely	 by	 inter-class	
contestation,	for	example	between	capital	and	the	‘classes	of	labour’,	but	also	by	
intra-class	 contestation,	 for	 example,	 between	 the	 different	 class	 fractions	 of	
capital.	 These	 inter-	 and	 intra-class	 relations	 may	 also	 be	 characterized,	 in	
different	conjunctures,	by	alliances	and	co-optation	as	much	as	by	contestation.	
We	 need,	 therefore,	 to	 pay	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 ‘political’	 dynamics	 of	
accommodation	 and	 resistance	 between	 neoliberalism	 (in	 the	 present	
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7	
conjuncture,	 usually	 the	 hegemonic	 class	 fraction)	 and	 other	 capitalist	 class	
fractions,	 notably	 sub-hegemonic	 movements	 (other,	 particularly	 nationally-
focused,	 forms	 of	 capitalism),	 and	 between	 these	 fractions	 and	 counter-
hegemonic	 movements	 (advocates	 of	 anti-capitalism).	 Rather	 than	 the	 simple	
binary	of	‘corporate	capital’	or	‘empire’	versus	the	‘multitude’	that	appears	to	be	
a	common	assumption	amongst	food	movement	activists	and	scholars,	therefore,	
the	picture	presented	here	is	one	of	a	spectrum	of	resistances	to	neoliberalism	of	
both	 a	 ‘systemic’	 (varieties	 of	 capitalism)	 and	 an	 ‘anti-systemic’	 (anti-capitalist)	
kind.		
This	picture	 is	 further	 complicated	by	 the	enduring,	dialectical	 relation	between	
capitalism	 and	 the	 state,	 which,	 through	 processes	 of	 class	 co-optation	 and	
compromise,	blurs	boundaries	between	capitalism	and	its	‘other’.	 	Thus,	through	
hegemony,	and	within	the	necessary	context	of	the	state-capital	nexus	as	I	term	it	
(Tilzey	2016a),	capitalism	has	been	remarkably	successful	 in	neutralizing	and	co-
opting	 resistance	 to	 its	 exploitative	 dynamic.	 This	 success,	 however,	 has	 been	
located	 differentially	 in	 the	 global	 North.	 An	 essential	 part	 of	 this	 ability	 to	
neutralize	and	co-opt	resistance	derives	from	the	capitalist	world	system’s	broadly	
bi-polar	 structure:	 the	 socially	 ‘articulated’	 states	 of	 the	 global	 North,	 and	 the	
‘disarticulated’	 states	 of	 the	 global	 South.1	 Tendentially,	 oppositional	 relations	
between	 capitalist	 and	 non-capitalist	 classes	 in	 ‘articulated’	 states	 have	 been	
defused	 by	 ‘flanking’	 measures	 based	 on	 (re)-distributional,	 nation-building,	
environmental	 and	 other	 policies,	 together	 with	 the	 bestowal	 of	 (bourgeois)	
citizenship	rights	(Chibber	2013,	Mooers	2014,	Moyo	and	Yeros	2011).		
In	 the	 face	 of	 increased	 neoliberal	 class	 exploitation,	 attempts	 to	 sustain	 this	
compact	 in	 the	 global	 North	 have	 been	 undertaken	 increasingly	 by	 means	 of	
imperial	relations,	both	‘informal’	(economic)	and	‘formal’	(politico-military),	with	
the	global	South.	Surplus	value	from	the	classes	of	labor	now	flows	from	South	to	
North,	 ‘subsidized’	 by	 the	 massive	 and	 destructive	 hemorrhage	 of	 ‘ecological	
surplus’	 that	 lies	behind	 this	 relationship	 (Exner	et	al.	 2013,	Moore	2015,	 Smith	
2016).	 	 Burgeoning	 levels	 of	 social	 and	 ecological	 dislocation	 in	 the	 South	 have	
been	the	consequence	of	 this	extractive	relationship.	Neoliberalism	has	similarly	
subverted	 the	 incipient	 processes	 of	 nation-building	 in	 the	 South	 that	 had	
characterized	 the	 Keynesian	 ‘developmentalist’	 era.	 Resurgent	 neoliberal	
primitive	accumulation,	with	the	state	acting	as	an	organ	of	the	expropriators	and	
agro-exporting	 fractions	 of	 capital,	 have	 served	 to	 undermine	 the	 legitimacy	
functions	 of	 the	 capital-state	 nexus	 throughout	 much	 of	 the	 global	 South.	 The	
outcome	 of	 this	 ‘new	 imperial’2	 relationship	 between	 North	 and	 South	 (Smith	
																																								 																				 	
1	Social	disarticulation	occurs	when	the	state-capital	nexus	is	interested	in	its	labor	force	principally	from	the	
perspective	of	production	(its	ability	to	generate	surplus	value)	and	not	primarily	from	the	perspective	of	
consumption	(the	realization	of	surplus	value	through	the	sale	of	commodities).	Social	articulation	implies	a	
complementarity	between	the	role	of	the	labor	force	as	producers	and	consumers,	or	a	situation	in	which	
their	role	as	consumers	outweighs	their	significance	as	producers.		
2	Although	circuits	of	transnational	capital	are	perforce	no	longer	nation-based,	the	whole	logic	of	imperialism	
arises	from	the	transfer	of	value	from	the	South	to	the	imperium	in	order	to	sustain	the	political-economic	
power	and	integrity	of	the	latter,	a	relation	sustained	only	by	the	imperial	state’s	capacity	to	act	as	guarantor	
of	its	transnational	capitalist	interests.	
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8	
2016)	is	that	citizens	of	the	former	are	accorded	privileges	denied	to	those	in	the	
capitalist	periphery	(see,	for	example,	Mooers	2014).		
This	 legitimacy	deficit	 in	the	global	South,	together	with	the	‘formal’	rather	than	
‘real’	subsumption	within	capital	of	the	semi-proletarian	majority,	carries	with	it,	
however,	 the	 increased	 likelihood	 of	 challenge	 to	 the	 state-capital	 nexus	 by	
counter-hegemonic	forces.		Attempted	re-appropriations	of	the	state	by	counter-
hegemonic	 social	 forces	 are	 implied,	 comprising	 re-assertions	 of	 national,	 and	
possibly	post-national	and	post-capitalistic,	 forms	of	 sovereignty3.	 	 Such	 ‘radical’	
counter-hegemonic	social	forces	potentially	challenge	the	essential	foundations	of	
capitalism,	potentially	 propounding	 a	more	Marxian	 (changed	 social	 relations	of	
production,	 reversal	 of	 primitive	 accumulation),	 rather	 than	 Polanyian	
(‘embedding’	 of	 capitalism),	 imaginary	 of	 social	 relational	 transformation	 (Tilzey	
2016b).	 Nonetheless,	 these	 global	 Southern	 re-assertions	 of	 sovereignty	 in	 its	
national	 form,	are	characterized	by	strong	ambiguity.	 	They	comprise	a	complex	
mélange	 of	 sub-hegemonic	 (national	 capital	 fractions,	 petty	 bourgeois	 upper	
peasantry)	 and	 counter-hegemonic	 (lower/middle	 peasantry,	 landless,	
proletarians,	and	 indigenous)	social	 forces.	The	assertion	of	national	 sovereignty	
here,	 as	 a	 counter-narrative	 to	 neoliberalism,	 represents	 a	 tension	 between	
populist,	 sub-hegemonic,	 ‘neo-developmentalism’,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	
(potentially)	 counter-hegemonic	 ‘post-developmentalism’	 (combining	
environmentalism,	 indigenism,	 re-peasantization,	 agroecology	 and	 food	
sovereignty),	on	the	other	(Veltmeyer	and	Petras	2014).	
This	may	be	described	as	a	Gramscian	and	Poulantzian	view	of	 the	 state-capital	
nexus,	 combined	 with	 a	 concern	 to	 understand	 their	 differing,	 but	 dialectically	
related,	 forms	 between	 the	 North	 and	 the	 South.	 Thus,	 Poulantzas,	 much	 like	
Gramsci,	defined	the	function	of	the	state	not	simply	in	terms	of	the	interests	of	
capitalist	class	fractions,	but	also	 in	terms	of	the	need	to	secure	the	cohesion	of	
society	as	a	whole.	For	the	state	properly	to	function	as	a	capitalist	state,	it	must	
be	able	to	go	against	the	individual	and	particular	fractional	interests	of	capitalists	
in	order	to	act	in	their	general	interest	as	a	class.	The	state	must	also	be	‘relatively	
autonomous’	 from	 the	 interests	 and	 demands	 of	 capitalists.	 Although	 this	 gives	
the	state	an	appearance	of	neutrality,	however,	its	class	character	is	implicit	in	its	
function	 in	 relation	to	capitalist	 society.	For	Poulantzas,	 then,	 the	state	provides	
the	 institutional	 space	 for	 various	 fractions	 of	 the	 capitalist	 class,	 in	 addition	
possibly	 to	other	classes,	 to	come	together	and	 form	 longer-term	strategies	and	
alliances,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 state	 disorganizes	 non-capitalist	 classes	
through	various	means	of	co-optation	and	division.		
This	Poulantzian,	rather	than	Polanyian,	view,	suggests	that	global	capitalism	and	its	state	
form	are	rather	less	monolithic,	and	more	fractured,	than	a	binary	view	of	‘corporate	empire’	
versus	 ‘society’	 would	 suggest.	 There	 is,	 firstly,	 an	 evident	 tension	 between	 the	 desire	 of	
transnational	 capitalist	 fractions	 to	 transcend	 the	 state	 and	 implant	 a	 global	 system	 of	
																																								 																				 	
3	The	other	side	of	this	picture	is,	of	course,	the	increased	use	of	coercion	and	violence	by	the	peripheral	
state-capital	nexus	in	the	exercise	of	primitive	accumulation,	frequently	supported	financially	and	militarily	by	
the	imperial	powers	whose	corporations	benefit	directly	from	the	expropriation	of	land	and	resources	from	
peasant	and	indigenous	populations	for	the	purposes	of	agro-export	or	mineral/fossil	fuel	extraction.		
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9	
‘frictionless’	capital	 flows4,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	need	by	 imperial	states,	particularly,	to	
continue	to	respond	to	more	nationally-based	class	fractions	and	to	secure	legitimacy	amongst	
the	non-capitalist	citizenry,	on	the	other.	Secondly,	given	the	necessarily	state-secured	nature	of	
capitalism,	the	emergence	of	semi-peripheral	states	as	the	outcome	of	‘globalization’	(notably	
the	BRICS)	contending	to	become	members	of	the	imperium	and	responding	to	nationally-based	
class	fractions,	represents	resistance	to	neoliberalism	by	sub-hegemonic	social	forces.	Thirdly,	the	
burgeoning	social	and	ecological	contradictions	of	imperial	relations	concentrated	largely	in	the	
South,	 and	 perpetuated	 by	 policies	 of	 neo-developmentalism	 and	 neo-extractivism,	 and	 by	
‘peripheral’	 forms	of	 surplus	appropriation	more	generally,	are	generating	 resistances	 to	 the	
state-capital	 nexus	 by	 ‘radical’	 counter-hegemonic	 social	 movements.	 There	 are	 multiple	
incoherencies	in	the	current	conjuncture.	These	are	potentially	most	disruptive	the	global	South	
because,	 as	 a	 periphery	 for	 the	 core,	 it	 is	 here	 that	 the	 contradictions	 of	 accumulation	 are	
greatest	 and	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	 state	 is	 lowest.	 Consequently,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 South	 that	 the	
potential	for	transformations	towards	‘radical’,	counter-hegemonic	futures	appears	greatest.	
In	 order	 to	 illustrate	 these	 theoretical	 arguments,	 this	 paper	 examines	 the	
dynamics	of	agrarian	class	struggle,	capitalism,	and	the	state	in	Bolivia	and	Nepal.	
The	Bolivian	case,	for	example,	demonstrates	clearly	the	inadequacy	of	any	simple	
binary	assumption	 relating	 to	a	 fully	 trans-nationalized	capital/state,	on	 the	one	
hand,	 and	 an	 oppositional,	 united	 ‘multitude’,	 on	 the	 other.	 The	 picture	 is	
considerably	more	 nuanced	 than	 this.	 This	 case	 study	 suggests,	 firstly,	 that	 the	
state,	 as	 a	 ‘social	 relation	 condensing	 the	 balance	 of	 class	 forces’	 (Poulantzas	
1975,	 Jessop	 2016),	 continues	 to	 be	 the	 key	 nexus	 through	 which	 capital	
accumulation	 is	 both	 secured	 and	 its	 contradictions	 ameliorated	 or	 legitimated.	
Secondly,	 that	 there	 is	 no	 one,	 undifferentiated	 capitalist	 class,	 but	 rather	
fluctuating	intra-capitalist	contestation	and	alliance	between	three	main	fractions:	
trans-national	capital,	national	 landed	oligarchy	(hegemonic	fractions),	and	small	
commercial	 farmers	 (‘upper	 peasantry’)	 and	 entrepreneurs	 (sub-hegemonic	
fractions).	Thirdly,	that	there	is	no	unified	‘peasant	way’	in	putative	opposition	to	
‘Empire’.	 Rather,	 we	 witness	 clear	 class	 differentiation	 between	 a	 commercial	
‘upper	 peasantry’,	 espousing	 an	 increasingly	 capitalist	 rationality,	 and	 a	 class	 of	
semi-proletarians	 and	 landless	 who	 constitute	 the	middle	 and	 lower	 peasantry,	
and	cleave	to	a	non-	or	anti-capitalist	ethos	(counter-hegemonic	class).	In	Bolivia,	
the	 sub-hegemonic	 class	 fractions	 have	 exploited	 widespread	 anti-neoliberal	
sentiment	to	install	 in	power	the	populist	Movimiento	al	Socialismo	(MAS)	party.	
MAS,	 despite	 its	 pro-peasant	 and	 indigenous	 rhetoric,	 does	 not	 support	 the	
smaller	 peasantry	 and	 landless	 in	 their	 agrarian	 struggles,	 however.	 Rather,	 it	
engages	 in	 an	 alliance	 with	 transnational,	 extractive	 capital	 selectively	 to	
																																								 																				 	
4	Transnational	capital	may	want	a	global	state,	but	trans-nationalization	and	the	simultaneous	transcendence	
of	the	nation-state	is	a	difficult	act	to	pull	off,	precisely	because	of	the	necessarily	uneven	development	of	
capitalism,	and	neoliberalism	especially,	and	the	resulting	legitimacy	crises	that	ensue.	Were	transnational	
capital	permitted	simply	to	operate	on	the	basis	of	the	global	free	movement	of	capital	and	labour	without	
the	current	labour	arbitrage	and	beneficial	transfers	of	value	to	the	imperium	that	currently	obtain,	
legitimacy	crises	would	sooner	or	later	be	inevitable.	The	collapse	of	the	Doha	Round	was	precisely	the	result	
of	the	imperium’s	reluctance	to	abandon	asymmetries	in	protection	that	permit	it	‘to	have	its	cake	and	eat	it’.	
But	even	these	asymmetrical	protections	vis-à-vis	the	South	have	proven	inadequate	to	insulate	the	North	
from	the	limits	of	legitimacy	that	are	manifest	in	Brexit	and	Trumpism.	So,	the	nation-state	does	seem	to	be	
profoundly	necessary	for	the	survival	of	capitalism	if	both	accumulation	and	legitimacy	functions	are	to	be	
fulfilled.		
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10	
‘compensate’,	via	state	welfare	schemes,	for	the	socio-ecological	dysfunctionality	
of	capitalism,	whilst	advancing	the	interests	of	its	own	core	support	amongst	the	
‘upper	peasantry’	(cocaleros).	In	this	way,	the	potential	counter-hegemony	of	the	
semi-proletariat,	landless,	and	indigenous	peoples,	is	both	dulled	by	means	of	the	
MAS	 ‘compensatory	 state’	 and	 thwarted	 by	 the	 opposed	 class	 interests	 of	 the	
‘upper	peasantry’,	the	landed	oligarchy,	and	trans-national	extractive	capital.	This	
process	 of	 class	 co-optation	 and	 division	 has	 also	 been	 facilitated	 by	 the	
deployment	of	post-classist	and	populist	indigenist	identity	politics,	characteristic	
of	 the	 ‘new	 social	 movements’.	 While,	 as	 we	 shall,	 deployment	 of	 ethnic	 and	
indigenous	identity	has	been	an	important	factor	in	fomenting	popular	discontent	
and	anti-neoliberal	mobilization,	and	hence	 in	 supporting	 the	 rise	of	 left-leaning	
regimes	 such	 as	 Bolivia	 and	 Ecuador,	 it	 has,	 by	 the	 same	 token,	 helped	 to	
obfuscate	 real	 class	 divisions	 and,	 thereby,	 subvert	 resolution	 of	 the	 agrarian	
question	in	favour	of	the	semi-proletariat	and	landless.		
	
Differentiation	of	‘Peasant’	Mobilization	between	States	
The	previous	section	identified	a	number	of	general	conceptual	tools	which	help	
us	 to	 explain	 why	 ‘counter-hegemonic’	 ‘peasant’	 mobilizations,	 as	 food	
sovereignty	movements,	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	 arise	 in	 the	 global	 South,	 and	how	
there	 is	 then	 the	potential	 for	 their	 co-optation	 in	populist	 regimes	 (or	outright	
repression	 where	 the	 regime	 remains	 oligarchical).	 This	 does	 not	 explain,	
however,	 the	 clear	 differentiation	 between	 states	 in	 the	 global	 South	 in	 the	
degree	 to	 which	 such	mobilizations	 have	 succeeded	 in	 unifying	 at	 the	 national	
level,	 in	 subsequently	 overthrowing	 neoliberal	 regimes,	 and	 in	 instituting	
constitutional	 and	 policy	 change,	 including	 provisions	 for	 food	 sovereignty.	 The	
key	 to	 successful	 anti-neoliberal	 protest	 in	 states	 such	 as	 Bolivia	 and	 Ecuador	
appears	to	be	founded	on	the	ability	to	deploy	ethnic	and	indigenous,	in	addition	
to	‘peasant’	positionalities,	as	an	‘anti-systemic’	‘master	frame’	(Rice	2012).	But,	in	
order	to	follow	through	on	‘counter-hegemonic’	transformation,	and	to	avoid	co-
optation	into	reformism,	there	seems	to	be	a	need	to	retain,	or	to	identify,	a	class	
basis	 for	 struggle	as	a	 complement,	 not	 as	 a	 negation,	 of	 the	wider	 indigenous,	
ethnic	 ‘master	 frame’.	 Similarly,	 the	 indigenous,	 ethnic	 and	 ‘new	 social	
movement’	 ‘master	 frame’	 should	 not	 be	 deployed	 to	 deny	 the	 profound	
importance	of	class.	
The	key,	 in	turn,	to	explaining	why	this	should	have	been	the	case	in	Bolivia	and	
Ecuador,	and	not	 in	neighbouring	Andean	states	of	Chile	and	Peru,	 for	example,	
seems	to	 lie	 in	the	way	 in	which	the	peasantry,	and	to	a	certain	extent	workers,	
were	historically	incorporated	into	the	state.	In	the	cases	of	Bolivia	and	Ecuador,	
ethnic	 identities	 and	 forms	 of	 mobilization	 came	 to	 dominate	 class-based	
organization.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 neighbouring	 states	 such	 as	 Chile	 and	 Peru,	 the	
distinct	 modes	 of	 popular	 political	 incorporation	 produced	 a	 dynamic	 whereby	
class-based	 identities	 and	 organizational	 forms	 came	 to	 dominate	 ethnic	
identification.	 Strong	 and	 cohesive	 indigenous	 movements	 tend	 to	 emerge	 in	
states,	 such	 as	 Bolivia	 and	 Ecuador,	 where	 the	 peasantry	 has	 been	 politically	
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11	
incorporated	by	multi-class,	populist	parties,	as	opposed	to	those	states,	such	as	
Chile	 and	Peru,	with	a	historical	pattern	of	peasant	mobilization	by	parties	with	
self-proclaimed	Marxist	 affinities.	 The	 grassroots	mobilizations	 of	 these	Marxist	
parties	 tended	 to	 create	 horizontal	 forms	 of	 organization,	 such	 as	 cooperatives	
and	peasant	unions,	which	competed	with,	and	in	part	served	to	undermine,	more	
traditional,	 indigenous	 associational	 forms,	 such	 as	 ayllus	 and	 comunas.	 In	
contrast,	 the	 vertical	 lines	 of	 dependence	 established	 between	 indigenous	
peoples	 and	 populist	 or	 clientelist	 parties	 did	 not	 replace	 the	 horizontal	
organizational	bonds	of	 indigenous	communities,	 and	 the	creation	of	 competing	
class-based	 bonds	 was	 less	 extensive	 than	 under	 explicitly	 leftist	 forms	 of	
incorporation.	Consequently,	with	the	advent	of	neoliberalism	in	the	global	South	
and	 the	 severing	of	 corporatist	 ties	of	 the	peasantry	 to	 the	 state,	 it	was	only	 in	
certain	 states	 that	 conditions	 existed	 for	 the	 re-emergence	 of	 indigenous	 and	
ethnic	identities	as	a	platform	for	widespread,	and	agrarian-based,	anti-neoliberal	
protest.	
In	 this	 way,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 mode	 of	 peasant	 incorporation	 into	 the	
modern,	 capitalist	 (peripheral)	 state	 sheds	 considerable	 light	 on	 the	 conditions	
that	facilitate	or	inhibit	the	articulation	of,	in	the	Andean	case,	ethnic	identities	as	
a	 ‘master	 frame’	 of	 anti-neoliberal	 protest.	 Following	 Yashar	 (1999)	 and	 Rice	
(2012),	it	is	possible	to	define	the	period	of	incorporation	of	the	peasantry	as	the	
first	 and	 sustained	 attempt	 at	 agrarian	 reform	 in	 a	 state,	 that	 is	 the	
transformation	of	pre-capitalist	 to	capitalist	 social	 relations	principally	by	means	
of	 the	 ‘Junker	 road’,	or	 the	 ‘farmer	 road’	 (de	 Janvry	1981).	Thus,	 it	was	 through	
agrarian	 reform,	 specifically	 the	 destruction	 of	 pre-capitalist	 and	 semi-servile	
labour	 relations,	 that	 the	 rural	masses	 in	 Latin	 America	were	 first	 incorporated	
into	 the	modern,	peripheral	 capitalist	 state.	Prior	 to	 these	agrarian	 reforms,	 the	
indigenous	peasantry	was	largely	under	the	political	control	of	the	rural	oligarchy,	
and	thus	unavailable	as	a	potential	base	of	support	for	contestation	by	classes	and	
class	fractions	in	and	around	the	state.	Henceforth,	there	would	be	an	institutional	
separation,	characteristic	of	 the	modern	capitalist	 state,	between	the	 ‘economy’	
and	 the	 ‘polity’,	 whereby	 ‘struggle’	 would	 be	 confined	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 the	
‘political’,	while	demands	 for	more	profound	 ‘social	 relational’	 transformation	 in	
the	 ‘economy’	 would	 be	 absorbed,	 within	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 capitalist	 state,	 by	
reformism.		
In	this	way,	two	patterns	of	peasant	incorporation	may	be	distinguished:	agrarian	
radicalism,	associated	with	the	‘farmer	road’	to	agrarian	capitalism,	whereby	class	
contestation	around	the	state	sought	to	organize	and	mobilize	the	support	of	the	
peasantry,	 and,	 in	 the	 process,	 offered	 it	 up	 for	 incorporation	 into	 the	 political	
system	by	 the	Marxist	 left.	 This	 type	 of	 incorporation	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 cases	 of	
Chile	 and	 Peru	 (the	 latter	 in	 the	 1969-1975	 reform	 period)	 (de	 Janvry	 1981).	
Agrarian	conservatism,	associated	with	the	‘Junker	road’,	 is	the	process	whereby	
the	peasantry	was	de-politicized	and	controlled	by	the	state/political	parties	and	
eventually	 incorporated	 into	 the	 polity	 by	 means	 of	 patron-client	 linkages	 to	
multi-class	populist	 parties.	 This	 second	 type	of	 incorporation,	 demonstrated	by	
the	cases	of	Bolivia	(1953-1964)	and	Ecuador	(1964-1976),	was	more	conducive	to	
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the	 eventual	 politicization	 of	 ethnic	 cleavages,	 since	 it	 allowed	 local	 indigenous	
communal	structures	and	associational	forms	to	remain	more	or	less	intact.	Ethnic	
identities	 took	 on	 greater	 political	 salience	 in	 these	 two	 states	 following	 the	
erosion	 of	 corporatist	 and	 clientelist	 linkages	 to	 parties	 under	 the	 pressures	 of	
neoliberal	reforms	in	the	1980s	(Rice	2012).		
In	 Bolivia,	 organized	 workers	 in	 the	 mining	 sector	 were	 historically	 the	 central	
protagonists	 of	 popular	 struggle.	 Since	 the	 1952	 ‘revolution’	 that	 brought	 the	
populist	MNR	to	power,	Bolivia’s	 strong,	Marxist-oriented	 labour	movement	has	
had	a	tenuous	relationship	to	the	governing	party.	The	peasantry,	however,	was	
depoliticized	 after	 the	 revolution	 and	 tied	 to	 the	 party	 through	 an	 elaborate	
system	 of	 state	 corporatism	 and	 clientilism.	 While	 labour	 in	 Bolivia	 has	 been	
organized	around	class-based	entities,	the	incorporation	of	the	peasantry	into	the	
political	 system	 followed	 a	 populist,	 clientilist	 pattern.	 The	 contemporary	
indigenous	movement,	 and	 agrarian	 protest	 of	 which	 it	 forms	 an	 integral	 part,	
reflect	 these	 contradictory	 legacies.	 Thus,	 while	 strong	 at	 the	 national	 level,	
enabling	Evo	Morales	to	sweep	to	power,	it	continues	to	be	divided	by	competing	
class	 and,	 potentially	 obfuscating,	 ethnicity-based	 demands,	 which	 render	 it	
susceptible	to	co-optation	into	reformism.	This	goes	some	way	towards	explaining	
the	 initial	 success,	 and	 subsequent	 disappointment,	 of	 counter-hegemonic	
mobilizations	in	both	Bolivia	and	Ecuador.	
In	 consequence,	 the	 Bolivian	 and	 Ecuadorian	 experiences	 of	 agrarian	 and	
indigenous-based	 mobilizations	 from	 the	 1990s	 are	 very	 similar.	 Thus,	 anti-
neoliberal	 agrarian	 protests	 were	 undertaken	 largely	 by	 the	 semi-proletarian	
peasantry,	located	mainly	in	the	Andes,	and	by	tribal/communitarian,	indigenous	
groups	 in	 the	 eastern	 lowlands	 (Oriente).	 The	 latter,	 in	 particular,	 have	 been	
adversely	 affected	 by	 the	 mineral/oil	 extractive	 and	 agri-food	 industries.	 The	
peasantry’s	 protests	 hark	 back	 to	 the	 incomplete	 land	 reforms	 and	 unresolved	
agrarian	 question	 of	 previous	 developmentalist	 episodes,	 characterized	 by	 the	
‘Junker	 road’	 to	 capitalism,	 whereby	 the	 landed	 oligarchy	 was	 the	 principal	
beneficiary	 of	 reform.	 Their	 primary	 demand	 is	 for	 adequate	 land	 for	 self-
subsistence	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 priority,	 and	 relief	 from	 the	 precarity	 of	 semi-
proletarian	 existence.	 Some	may	 aspire	 to	become	members	 of	 the	 commercial	
(petty	 bourgeois)	 upper	 peasantry,	 but	 these	 are	 a	 minority.	 These	 protests,	
making	them	distinct	 from	previous	mobilizations,	also	have	an	overlay	of	 ‘post-
developmental’	 discourse,	 comprising	 concern	 for	 issues	 of	 indigeneity,	 gender,	
and	 ecology.	 In	 some	 respects,	 therefore,	 these	 protests	 have	 become	 ‘post-
classist’,	but	the	class	problematic	nonetheless	remains	strong,	while	exhibiting	a	
strong	 indigenous	 inflection.	 These	 groups,	 in	 essence,	 are	 looking	 beyond	
capitalism	 and	 the	 capitalist	 state,	 in	 other	 words,	 beyond	 reformism.	 Their	
advocacy,	 then,	 appears	 to	 be	 directed,	 via	 profound	 social	 relational	 change	
away	from	capitalism,	towards	what	might	be	termed	livelihood	sovereignty	–	the	
ability	 to	 lead	 fulfilling	 lives	 in	 socially	 and	 ecological	 sustainable	 ways,	 free	 of	
exploitation	and	the	compulsion	to	sell	labour	power	to	others.	
But	 these	 ‘radical’,	 counter-hegemonic	 groups	 have	 run	 up	 against,	 and	
sometimes	 been	 co-opted	 by,	 reformist,	 sub-hegemonic,	 nationally	 defined,	
discourses	 of	 sovereignty,	 including	 food	 sovereignty	 as	 productivist,	 national	
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agriculture.	 This	 discourse	 is	 articulated	 also	 by	 the	 small	 class	 of	 commercial	
family	farmers	(that	is,	the	former	‘upper	peasantry’,	not	the	capitalist	estates	of	
the	 oligarchy),	 for	 example,	 the	 cocaleros	 of	 Bolivia.	 These	 sub-hegemonic	
constituencies	 take	 their	 reformist	 cue,	 in	 part,	 from	 former	 developmentalist	
episodes,	such	as	the	MNR	in	the	case	of	Bolivia,	a	populist	movement	that	sought	
to	 build	 national	 ‘articulated’	 development.	 The	 populist	 regimes	 of	Morales	 in	
Bolivia	 and	 Correa	 in	 Ecuador	 articulate	 these	 sub-hegemonic	 discourses,	 and	
have	 utilized	 widespread	 anti-neoliberal	 sentiment	 to	 forge	 alliances	 with	
counter-hegemonic	 groups,	 united	 by	 a	 rhetoric	 of	 anti-colonialism/imperialism	
and	 of	 indigenous	 revival	 and	 livelihood	 principles	 such	 as	 buen	 vivir.	 But	 this	
rhetorical	 ‘master	 frame’	 hides	 the	 class	 divisions	 and	 real	 motivations	 that	
underlie	 the	 populist	 projects	 –	 those	 of	 favouring	 small	 scale	 and	 national	
capitalists	 through	 reformism,	 whilst	 largely	 neglecting	 the	 counter-hegemonic	
aims,	 and	 current	 reproductive	 crisis,	 of	 the	 peasantry	 and	 lowland	 indigenous	
groups.	
	
Bolivia:	The	Agrarian	Question	and	the	Subversion	of	Counter-
Hegemony	through	Reformism	
We	now	examine	the	case	of	Bolivia,	an	exemplar	of	the	trends	 identified	 in	the	
previous	section	
Bolivia,	 like	 many	 other	 countries	 in	 the	 global	 South	 and	 in	 Latin	 America,	
underwent	 a	 neoliberal	 ‘structural	 adjustment	 policy’	 (SAP)	 during	 the	 1980s.	
Thus,	 Bolivia’s	 ‘New	 Economic	 Policy’	 of	 1985	 dismantled	 public	 services	 and	
exposed	the	peasantry	and	 indigenous	groups	 to	enhanced	capital	accumulation	
by	 the	 agri-food	 oligarchy	 and	 transnational	 corporations.	 Neoliberal	 policies	
reached	a	peak	of	unpopularity	with	 the	privatization	of	 the	 state-owned	water	
company	SEMAPA	(Servicio	Municipal	de	Agua	Potable	y	Alcantarillado),	sparking	
the	resulting	‘Cochabamba	Water	War’.	This	mobilization	combined	with	massive	
protests	by	Bolivia’s	largest	union	of	peasants	(the	rural	workers’	union,	CSUTCB,	
(Confederacion	 Sindical	 Unica	 de	 Trabajadores	 Campesinas	 de	 Bolivia)	 and	 a	
general	 strike	 called	 by	 the	 non-rural	 workers’	 union,	 the	 COB	 (Central	 Obrera	
Boliviana).	Three	years	of	clashes	between	protesters	and	the	oligarchic	state	led	
ultimately	to	the	toppling	of	two	Bolivian	presidents.	The	2005	election	witnessed	
a	clear	victory	for	Evo	Morales,	the	 leader	of	the	coca	growers’	union.	His	party,	
MAS	(Movimiento	al	Socialismo),	was	closely	 linked	to	the	emergent	 indigenous,	
anti-colonial,	and	populist	social	movements	that	had	coalesced	 in	opposition	to	
the	neoliberal	reforms	of	the	1990s	and	beyond.	This	broad	coalition	of	peasant,	
indigenous,	 and	worker	 organizations	 formed	 the	 Pacto	 de	 Unidad	 (Unity	 Pact)	
which	was	essential	 in	Morales’	rise	to	power	and	became	integrated,	to	varying	
degrees,	 within	 the	 new	 regime	 (Fabricant	 2012,	 Webber	 2015,	 McKay	 et	 al.	
2014).	
An	 important	 source	 of	 rural	 anti-neoliberal	 protest	 derived	 from	 the	 parlous	
condition	of	the	peasantry	in	Bolivia,	particularly	the	middle	and	lower	peasantry.	
Thus,	rural	class	structure	in	Bolivia	is	characterized	by	a	concentration	of	land	in	
the	 hands	 of	 a	 few,	 and	 large	 numbers	 of	 often	 landless	 peasants.	 Haciendas	
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occupy	 ninety	 per	 cent	 of	 Bolivia's	 productive	 land,	 leaving	 only	 ten	 per	 cent	
divided	 between	 mostly	 indigenous	 peasant	 communities	 and	 smallholding	
peasants.	Four	hundred	individuals	own	seventy	per	cent	of	productive	land,	while	
there	 are	 two	 and	 a	 half	 million	 landless	 peasants	 in	 a	 country	 of	 nine	million	
people	 (seventy-seven	 per	 cent	 of	 peasants	 are	 indigenous)	 (Enzinna	 2007,	
Webber	2015).		
Of	the	446,000	peasant	production	units	remaining	in	the	country	today,	225,000	
are	located	in	the	altiplano,	164,000	in	the	valley	departments	(yungas),	and	only	
57,000	 in	 the	 eastern	 low-	 lands.	 Capitalist	 relations	 of	 production	 now	
predominate	 in	 the	 eastern	 lowlands	 and	 are	 increasingly	 displacing	 small-scale	
peasant	production	 in	 the	valleys	and	altiplano,	although	the	 latter	continues	to	
be	 the	most	 important	 form	of	production	 in	 the	altiplano	 (Ormachea	Saavedra	
2007).	(The	altiplano	accounts	for	only	nineteen	per	cent	of	total	cultivated	land.)	
The	rural	population	is	diminishing	throughout	the	country	as	processes	of	semi-	
proletarianization	and	proletarianization	accelerate	with	the	gradual	expansion	of	
capitalist	 relations	of	production	to	all	parts	of	 the	country	 (Ormachea	Saavedra	
2007).	 From	 the	 early	 1970s,	migrant	 semi-proletarians	 provided	 the	workforce	
for	sugarcane	and	cotton	harvests	in	the	lowlands,	while,	for	the	rest	of	the	year,	
they	maintained	small	plots	of	land	in	the	highland	departments	from	which	they	
primarily	travelled	(that	 is,	Cochabamba,	Potosi,	and	Chuquisaca).	Between	1976	
and	1996,	rural	population	as	a	percentage	of	total	population	fell	from	fifty-nine	
to	 thirty-nine	 percent	 (Pacheco	 Balanza	 and	 Ormachea	 Saavedra	 2000).	 This	
decline	was	caused	by	two	main	factors:	declining	production	in	the	altiplano	due	
to	soil	exhaustion	and	increasing	division	of	land	into	minifundios	over	time	due	to	
population	expansion;	and	increased	capitalization	of	agriculture	in	the	lowlands,	
leading	to	decreased	employment	opportunities	(Pacheco	Balanza	and	Ormachea	
Saavedra	2000).	This	squeeze	has	accentuated	the	differentiation	of	the	peasantry	
into	 rich,	 medium,	 and	 poor	 strata.	 1988	 survey	 data	 suggest	 that	 seventy-six	
percent	of	peasantry	were	poor	peasants	(lacking	means	to	reproduce	their	family	
labour-power	 on	 their	 own	 land	 and	 obliged	 to	 sell	 labour	 elsewhere	 on	 a	
temporary	basis).	Medium	peasants	constituted	eleven	percent	of	 the	peasantry	
(defined	 as	 family	 units	 able	 to	 reproduce	 labour	 without	 selling	 labour-power	
elsewhere).	 Rich	 peasants	 (making	 a	 profit	 after	 reproducing	 their	 family	 and	
means	 of	 production,	 and	 purchasing	 the	 labour	 of	 poorer	 peasants	 and	 using	
modern	technology)	comprised	thirteen	percent	(Ormachea	Saavedra	2007).	This	
process	 of	 peasant	 differentiation	 has	 only	 accelerated	 since	 then	 (the	 middle	
being	squeezed),	with	 richer	peasants	becoming	commercial	 farmers	 (Ormachea	
Saavedra	2007).		
To	 what	 extent	 has	 the	 Morales	 regime	 addressed	 these	 contradictions	 of	 the	
peasantry?	 Following	 on	 the	 demands	 for	 a	 constituent	 assembly	 made	 by	
indigenous	and	peasant	organizations,	Morales	initiated	a	process	through	which	
a	new	constitution	would	be	written	in	which	provision	was	to	be	made	for	‘food	
sovereignty’.	When	the	constitution	was	finally	approved	in	2009,	it	included	food	
sovereignty	 as	 a	 central	 element	 of	 several	 sections	 of	 the	 document.	 First,	 it	
refers	 (Article	 255)	 to	 food	 sovereignty	 in	 the	 context	 of	 international	 relations	
and	 treaties,	 suggesting	 that	 they	 must	 function	 to	 meet	 the	 interests	 and	
sovereignty,	 including	 food	 sovereignty,	 of	 the	 people	 (Bolivian	 Constitution	
2009).	 Second,	 the	 chapter	 on	 Sustainable	 Integrated	 Rural	 Development	
emphasizes	 food	 sovereignty	 as	 integral	 to	 rural	 development,	 laying	 out	 the	
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objective	 to	 ‘ensure	 food	 security	 and	 sovereignty,	 prioritizing	 domestic	
production	 and	 consumption…and	 establishing	 mechanisms	 to	 protect	 Bolivian	
agriculture	(Bolivian	Constitution	2009,	Article	405)	(Fabricant	2012,	McKay	et	al.	
2014).	It	is	important	to	note	that	these	statements	could	be	taken	to	mean	either	
productivism	 and	 developmentalism,	 or	 a	more	 pro-peasant	 and	 agroecological	
programme,	or	 indeed	both.	As	we	shall	 see,	 the	emphasis	has	 tended	to	be	on	
the	first	of	these	options	rather	than	the	second.		
The	 position	 of	 the	Morales	 regime	with	 respect	 to	 food	 sovereignty	 is	 further	
clarified	 in	 the	 first	 National	 Development	 Plan	 defined	 in	 2006.	 Here	 food	
sovereignty	was	identified	as	a	key	element	in	the	‘new	vision	for	development’,	
the	vision	 in	 fact	being	very	 reformist	 in	character	and	drawing	 inspiration	 from	
the	MAS’	populist	predecessor,	 the	MNR,	which	came	to	power	 in	 the	1950s.	 In	
2008,	 the	 ‘new	 vision’	 was	 elaborated	 into	 the	 Rural	 Development	 and	 Food	
Sovereignty	 and	 Food	 Security	 Policy	 (PSSA),	 and	 this	 was	 to	 be	 implemented	
through	four	main	programmes:	
1. SEMBRAR,	 promoting	 private-public	 partnerships	 and	 largely	 dependent	
on	 overseas	 development	 assistance	 for	 short-term	 investment	 projects	
designed	 to	 increase	 food	 production	 (Ministerio	 de	 Desarollo	 Rural	 y	
Tierras	(MDRyT)	2010,	63);	
2. CRIAR,	 financing	 community-led	 initiatives	 to	 support	 small-scale	
agriculture	(MDRyT	2010);	
3. EMPODERAR,	funding	agro-entrepreneurial	development	projects	(MDRyT	
2010);	
4. Promotion	 of	 Agroecological	 Production	 (Fomento	 a	 la	 Produccion	
Ecologica/Organica),	supporting	agroecological	producers	with	production	
and	marketing	(MDRyT	2010,	66).		
These	 programmes	 relied	 upon	 external	 funding	 and	 did	 not	 significantly	
restructure	 agriculture	 and	 governance	 (McKay	 et	 al.	 2014)	 and,	 by	 definition,	
therefore,	did	not	change	the	relations	of	production,	or	social-property	relations,	
upon	which	 any	 transition	 to	 a	more	 ‘radical’	 vision	 of	 food	 sovereignty	 would	
have	depended.		
A	potentially	more	direct	means	of	engendering	food	sovereignty	took	the	form	of	
Bolivia’s	 ‘Agrarian	 Revolution’	 under	 the	 2006	 Ley	 de	 Reconduccion	 no.	 3545	
(Extension	 Law).	 This	 redefined	 natural	 resources	 as	 state	 property,	 and	 placed	
greater	emphasis	on	state	control	and	oversight	of	land	consolidation	and	labour	
relations.	The	programme	has	four	main	policy	aims:	
1. The	distribution	of	state-owned	land	and	redistribution	by	expropriation	of	
land	not	serving	a	‘socio-economic	function’	(FES)	in	respect	of	indigenous	
peoples	and	peasant	communities;	
2. The	mechanization	of	agriculture;	
3. Subsidized	credits	for	small-scale	producers;	
4. Markets	for	the	products	of	peasant	origin.	
The	redistribution	of	land,	unfortunately,	has	largely	failed	to	happen,	so	that	the	
main	 beneficiaries	 of	 this	 reform	 have	 been	 the	 small	 commercial	 farms	 of	 the	
upper	 peasantry	 (the	 crucial	 petty	 bourgeois	 constituency	 for	 the	 populist	
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reformists).	Moreover,	 the	 agrarian	 oligarchy	 of	 the	 eastern	 lowlands	 has	 been	
left	 essentially	 intact	 (Fabricant	 2012,	 Webber	 2015).	 Thus,	 superficially,	 the	
agrarian	 reform	appeared	 to	 be	 relatively	 successful,	with	more	 than	 thirty-one	
million	hectares	being	titled	and	over	100,000	of	these	titles	being	distributed	to	
174,249	beneficiaries	(McKay	et	al.	2014,	INRA	2010,	Redo	et	al.	2011).	However,	
crucially,	 ninety	 per	 cent	 of	 titled	 land	 has	 ‘been	 endowed	 by	 the	 state	 and	 is	
composed	entirely	of	forest	reserves’	(Redo	et	al.	2011,	237).	Thus,	less	than	ten	
per	cent	of	the	reform	sector	has	actually	been	redistributed	to	those	who	need	it	
most.	 So,	 while	 the	 ‘Agrarian	 Revolution’	 was	 ‘intended’	 to	 challenge	 the	
prevailing	and	unequal	agrarian	structure,	it	has	failed	to	do	so.	For	example,	the	
land	ceiling	of	5000	hectares	in	the	reform	has	been	rendered	effectively	obsolete	
by	 Article	 315	 (II)	 which	 states	 that	 if	 a	 corporation	 has	 several	 ‘owners’	 or	
‘partners’,	 each	 can	 have	 a	maximum	of	 5000	 hectares,	making	 land	 size	 limits	
virtually	 non-existent	 (McKay	 et	 al.	 2014).	 Furthermore,	 the	 land	 ceiling	 applies	
only	to	land	acquired	after	2009,	exacerbating	its	ineffectiveness.	The	provision	of	
credit	 for	 agricultural	mechanization	 is	 also	 clearly	 designed	 to	 benefit	 the	 new	
class	of	 small	 commercial	 farms,	not	 the	middle	and	 lower	peasantries,	while	of	
course	being,	at	the	same	time,	environmentally	unsustainable.	
The	process	of	middle	and	lower	peasant	attrition	has	therefore	continued	under	
the	government	of	Evo	Morales,	despite	his	pro-peasant	and	indigenous	rhetoric.	
Capitalist	 social	 relations	 in	 agriculture	 have	 continued	 to	 expand	 under	 this	
regime,	 from	seventy-nine	percent	of	 farm	production	 to	eighty-two	percent.	 In	
2005-6	 small	 peasant	 production	 accounted	 for	 twenty-five	 percent	 of	 total	
agricultural	production	in	the	altiplano.	By	2008-9,	however,	this	figure	had	fallen	
to	 under	 twenty-two	 percent.	 State	 subsidies	 and	 support	 are	 directed	 to	
capitalist,	agro-industrial	production	in	the	lowlands	and	to	the	small	commercial	
farm	sector,	while	small-scale	peasant	producers	 in	 the	highlands	are	effectively	
abandoned	(Ormachea	Saavedra	2011).		
The	populist,	reformist,	Polanyian	position	of	Morales	has	its	own	policies	and	its	
own	 analytics,	 deriving	 from	 its	 essentially	 petty	 bourgeois	 (‘progressive’)	 class	
base.	According	to	this	class	positionality,	the	peasantry	is	a	homogeneous	group,	
defined	by	Chayanovian	principles,	by	indigeneity,	and	by	opposition	to	corporate,	
monopoly	 capital	 and	 to	 the	 landed	 oligarchy.	 By	 contrast,	 a	 ‘radical’,	 counter-
hegemonic,	or	class	relational	positionality,	would	suggest	that	certain	groups	of	
the	 peasantry,	 that	 is,	 the	 upper	 peasant	 stratum,	 are	 actually	 benefitting	 from	
these	 processes	 of	 differentiation	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 other	 groups	 e	 that	 is,	 the	
great	majority	in	the	form	of	semi-proletarians	and	the	rapidly	diminishing	cohort	
of	middle	peasants.	The	 reality	 is	 that	a	 significant,	and	growing,	 stratum	of	 the	
peasantry	 is	 coming	 to	 be	 defined	 as	 ‘rich’	 as	 per	 the	 tripartite	 classification	
above.	It	is	accruing	profits	as	a	direct	result	of	surplus	appropriation	through	the	
work	of	salaried	labourers,	that	is,	of	semi-proletarians	from	the	growing	stratum	
of	 poor	 peasants	 in	 most	 instances.	 They	 also	 have	 growing	 motivations	 for	
expanding	 accumulation	 through	 expropriation	 of	 further	 land,	 either	 from	 the	
middle	 or	 lower	 strata	 of	 peasantry,	 or	 from	 indigenous	 tribal	 groups	 in	 the	
lowlands	through	a	process	of	primitive	accumulation	(Ormachea	Saavedra	2011,	
Webber	2015).		
The	result	 is	that	 it	 is	very	difficult	to	speak	of	a	 ‘peasant	way’	 in	general	as	one	
encompassing	the	class	interests	of	all	three	strata	of	peasantry.	Rather,	the	upper	
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peasantry	 is	 likely	 to	espouse	a	 type	of	Polanyian	 ‘alterity’	more	akin	 to	 that	of	
small	 capitalists	 and	 petty	 commodity	 producers	 of	 the	 global	 North	 (the	
‘progressives’	 accoroding	 to	 Holt-Gimenez	 and	 Shattuck	 2011),	 their	 primary	
opponents	 being	 the	 agro-industrial	 landed	 oligarchy	 with	 whom	 they	 are	 in	
competition	 for	 land	 and	 labour,	 and	 the	 transnational	 corporations.	 Absent	
threats	 from	 this	 quarter,	 the	 rich	 peasantry	 is	 relatively	 happy	with	 the	 status	
quo	under	MAS,	from	whom	the	latter	draws	its	core	support	(and	the	class	from	
which	Morales	himself	 comes),	 and	which	 is	one	of	 the	main	beneficiaries	 from	
the	 ‘Agrarian	 Revolution’.	 By	 contrast,	 it	 is	 the	 middle	 and	 semi-proletarian	
peasantry	 who,	 for	 the	 reasons	 identified	 above,	 are	 most	 likely	 to	 advocate	
‘radical’	change	away	from	the	status	quo	and	towards	land	and	food	sovereignty	
-	 a	 change	 involving,	 at	 its	 heart,	 fundamental	 land	 reform	 in	 favour	 of	 these	
lower	peasant	strata.	This	 is	a	counter-hegemonic	road	to	alterity	through	social	
relational	 change	 to	 ‘real	 citizenship’	 through	human	emancipation	by	means	of	
the	re-unification	of	producers	with	their	means	of	production.	The	land	involved	
in	such	reform	will	need	to	be	taken	not	only	from	the	landed	oligarchy	but	also	
from	the	upper	stratum	of	peasantry.	The	objective	of	such	land	reform	is	likely	to	
be	the	creation	of	a	stable	stratum	of	middle	peasantry,	able	to	support	 its	own	
reproduction	 and	 to	 produce	 modest	 surpluses	 from	 which	 to	 supply	 the	 non-
farming	population.		
A	 transformation	 in	 this	direction	will	be	 important,	 indeed	vital,	 for	both	social	
and	 ecological	 reasons.	 The	 current	 conjuncture	 is	 highly	 unstable	 and	
unsustainable	 for	both	 reasons	 -	 for	 the	social	 reasons	 identified	above,	and	 for	
the	 ecological	 reasons	deriving	 from	 the	nature-destroying	 and	 fossil-fuel	 based	
character	 of	 the	 agro-industrial	 agriculture	 being	 practiced	 in	 the	 eastern	
lowlands.	 The	 classes	 benefitting	 from	 this	 process,	 the	 landed	 oligarchy,	
extractive	 industries,	 and	 the	 upper	 peasantry,	 are	 placing	 in	 jeopardy	 the	
livelihoods	 of	 the	majority	 of	 Bolivians	 -	 the	middle	 and	 lower	 peasantry	 (semi-
proletarians),	the	urban	proletariat,	and	lowland	indigenous	groups.	To	date,	the	
urban	proletariat	has	been	placated	by	the	‘compensatory	state’	(Gudynas	2012)	
through	 the	 proceeds	 of	 ecologically	 and	 socially	 destructive	 extractivism	 e	 but	
this	cannot	continue	and	is,	indeed,	faltering,	as	the	commodity	boom	decelerates	
and	 austerity	 again	 begins	 to	 bite.	 The	 class	 interests	 of	 the	middle	 and	 lower	
peasantries	coincide	in	this	conjuncture	with	those	of	proletarians	e	indeed	many	
‘proletarians’	are	semi-proletarians.	If	the	sustainable	utilization	and	stewardship	
of	Bolivia's	rich	ecosystems,	including	agro-	ecosystems,	are	to	be	assured	through	
food	and	land	sovereignty	for	the	long-term	benefit	of	all	as	‘real	citizens’,	then	an	
alliance	of	 these	subaltern	social	 forces	 -	 the	middle/lower	peasantry,	 the	urban	
proletariat,	 and	 lowland	 indigenous	 groups	 -	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 an	 imperative	
development.		
In	 the	 present,	 but	 increasingly	 unstable,	 conjuncture,	 buen	 vivir	 has	 been	
deployed	as	the	foundational	‘myth’	for	the	MAS	populist	programme,	taken	as	a	
projection	of	the	collective,	cooperative	Andean	and	 indigenous	way.	The	reality	
described	above,	one	of	extractive	capital	and	the	peripheral,	compensatory	state,	
is	very	different	from	this	assumed	cooperative	ideal.	Using	this	cooperative	ideal	
to	legitimate	its	standing	amongst	the	subaltern	classes,	MAS	has	attempted,	via	
the	compensatory	state	and	reformism,	to	embed	capitalism	in	Polanyian	fashion	
by	 mitigating,	 in	 some	 measure,	 the	 impacts	 of	 extractivism	 on	 the	 subaltern	
classes.		
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Are	there	any	indications	that	the	agrarian	question	in	Bolivia	may	be	resolved	in	
favour	 of	 a	 ‘radical’,	 counter-hegemonic	 interpretation	 of	 food	 sovereignty?	
Under	 conditions	 of	 neo-extractivism	 and	 the	 ‘compensatory	 state’,	 the	 class	
struggle	in	Bolivia	appears	to	have	assumed	two	principle	dimensions	(Veltmeyer	
2014).	The	first	dimension	relates	to	labour	in	the	public	sector	and	to	the	mass	of	
proletarianized	 and	 semi-proletarianized	 rural	 and	 urban	 workers	 comprising,	
firstly,	the	huge	urban	proletariat	of	self-employed	workers	in	the	informal	sector	
and,	secondly,	a	rural	proletariat	of	 landless	or	near-	 landless	workers.	Labour	in	
this	sector	makes	up	well	over	half	 the	 ‘economically	active	population’	and	the	
mass	 of	 the	 urban	 poor.	 This	 dimension	 of	 struggle	 refers	 in	 the	main	 to	 rural	
urban	dynamics	in	the	altiplano	and	yungas	regions	of	Bolivia,	largely	outside	the	
new	extractive	zones	located	primarily	in	the	eastern	lowlands	of	the	country.		
The	 second	dimension	of	 class	 struggle,	 located	 largely	 in	 the	eastern	 lowlands,	
relates,	firstly,	to	the	conditions	generated	by	the	operations	of	extractive	capital,	
conditions	that	have	given	rise	to	conflict	between	the	mining	companies	and	the	
government,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 indigenous	 peoples	 and	 communities	
negatively	affected	by	extractivism,	on	the	other.	It	relates,	secondly,	to	the	mega-
infrastructure	 projects	 proposed	 or	 undertaken	 by	 the	 MAS	 government	 and	
capital	in	support	of	extractivism	(Veltmayer	2014).	The	class	struggle	here	is	one	
waged	essentially	by	indigenous	groups	in	defence	of	their	territorial	rights	to	the	
land,	water	and	subsoil	 resources	on	which	 their	 social	existence	and	well-being	
depend,	and	in	protest	against	the	destructive	effects	of	mining	operations	on	the	
environment	and	their	livelihoods.	The	movements	formed	to	this	end	have	been	
increasingly	 active	 in	 recent	 years,	 as	 the	 foreign	 mining	 companies	 have	
intensified	their	operations	with	government	support	(Webber	2015).	
There	 are	 indications	 that	 these	 two	 dimensions	 of	 the	 class	 struggle	 are	
beginning	to	coalesce,	with	the	confrontation	between	the	government	and	social	
movements	 becoming	 increasingly	 dynamic	 and	 fractious.	 The	 proposal	 by	 the	
MAS	government	to	construct	a	trans-continental	highway	through	the	Territorio	
Indigena	y	Parque	Isiboro	Secure	(TIPNIS)	in	support	of	extractivism	and	against	its	
own	constitutional	commitment	to	protect	indigenous	lands	and	nature	has	acted	
as	 a	 catalyst	 for	 the	 coalescence	 of	 these	 two	 dimensions	 of	 class	 struggle	
(Ormachea	Saavedra	2011,	Veltmeyer	2014).	
The	 approach	 to	 development	 taken	 by	 the	 Morales	 government,	 the	
‘compensatory	state’	through	‘progressive’	extractivism,	and	the	policy	measures	
taken	 to	 redress	 the	 ‘inequality	 predicament’,	 raise	 serious	questions	 about	 the	
likelihood,	or	even	the	possibility,	of	this	regime	consolidating	and	sustaining	the	
few,	although	strategically	directed,	gains	made	towards	fulfilling	its	stated	aim	of	
creating	a	cooperative	and	communitarian	society	in	which	all	Bolivians	‘live	well’	
in	 social	 solidarity	 and	 in	 harmony	 with	 mother	 nature	 (Veltmeyer	 2014).	 The	
government,	 like	others	 in	Latin	America,	has	chosen	to	build	 the	compensatory	
state	on	the	proceeds	of	a	particularly	regressive	and	destructive	form	of	capital	
accumulation,	 in	 which	 the	 heavy	 social	 and	 environmental	 costs	 are	 borne	
disproportionately	by	the	communities	most	directly	affected	by	the	operations	of	
extractive	capital	(Veltmeyer	and	Petras	2014).	
This	extractivist	offensive	has	given	rise	to	a	destabilizing	process	of	class	struggle	
characterized	by	a	veritable	wave	of	protest	and	social	resistance	(Webber	2015).	
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In	 the	 last	 few	 years,	 a	 large	 number	 of	 movements	 and	 struggles	 have	 been	
calling	into	question	the	extractivist-export	model	and	its	attendant	violence	and	
environmental	 devastation	 wrought	 primarily	 by	 transnational	 capital	 via	 the	
medium	of	the	Morales	regime.	By	means	of	the	compensatory	state,	the	Morales	
government	has	constructed	a	structure	of	legitimacy,	or	in	other	words	‘flanking’	
measures,	 to	 support	 renewed	 capital	 accumulation	 through	 extractivism	
(Orellana	2011).	This	represents	an	attempt	to	embed	capitalism	through	income	
and	 infrastructure	 measures	 for	 low-income	 groups	 founded	 on	 a	 narrative	 of	
communalism	 and	 cooperation	 as	 vivir	 bien.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	MAS	 government	
had,	 until	 recently,	 temporarily	 stabilized	 the	 contradiction	 between	 the	
accumulation	and	 legitimation	 functions	of	 the	 capitalist	 state.	But	because	 this	
development	 model,	 as	 reformism,	 has	 failed	 to	 address	 the	 class	 and	
environmental	 contradictions	of	 capitalism,	 it	 now	appears	 to	be	unravelling,	 as	
elsewhere	 in	 Latin	 America.	 With	 the	 de-legitimation	 of	 extractivism,	 the	
proletariat,	 lower	 and	middle	 peasants,	 and	 indigenous	 groups	 are	 increasingly	
advocating	a	model	of	the	cooperative	society	beyond	capitalism.	The	capacity	of	
the	 ‘compensatory	 state’	 to	 subvert	 counter-hegemony	 by	 means	 of	 strategic	
material	 and	 rhetorical	 devices	 (including	 anti-imperialism	 and	 indigenism)	
remains	strong,	however,	and	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	reflexive	responses	
by	 the	 subaltern	 classes	 to	 Bolivia’s	 socio-ecological	 crisis	 can	 transform	
reformism	into	revolution.	
Nepal	
As	noted,	the	precise	reason	for	selecting	Bolivia	and	Nepal	as	case	studies	is	that	
both	states	have	food	sovereignty	written	into	their	respective	constitutions,	facts	
that	 reflect	 the	 force	 of	 rural	 social	 movements,	 particularly	 during	 the	 first	
decade	of	the	new	millennium,	in	pushing	for	agrarian	reform	against	entrenched	
landed	oligarchies,	political	marginalization,	and	the	neoliberalization	of	policy.	In	
this	there	are	broad	structural	similarities	between	the	two	states:	largely	agrarian	
social	 base	 (albeit	 with	 a	 largely	 and	 increasingly	 semi-proletarian	 ‘peasantry’),	
unequal	 land	distribution	(majority	of	rural	population	with	insufficient	access	to	
land	 to	 meet	 subsistence	 requirements),	 progressive	 semi-proletarianization	 of	
‘peasantry’,	 large	 ‘informal’	 economy,	 and	 growth	 of	 remittance	 economy.	 The	
significance	 of	 these	 structural	 similarities,	 and	 the	 continuing	 relevance	 of	 the	
agrarian	 question	 and	 ‘peasant’	 protest,	 is	 captured	 by	 a	 broadly	
Gramscian/Poulantzian/peripheral	state	version	of	Marxian	theory	 in	which	class	
dynamics,	 the	 state,	 imperialism,	 and	 dependent	 development	 are	 central	
analytical	 categories	 (although	 the	 analytics	 here,	 in	 line	 with	 ‘post-
developmental’	 thinking,	 now	 question	 profoundly	 both	 the	 desirability	 or	
feasibility	 of	 capitalist	 development	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 and	more	 particularly	 as	 a	
putatively	necessary	prelude	to	a	socialist	future).		
There	 are,	 nonetheless,	 significant	differences	between	 the	 case	 studies:	 Bolivia	
has	a	 large	primary	export	economy	–	agriculture,	oil,	minerals,	 together	with	a	
significant	 nationally-focused	 bourgeoisie;	 Nepal	 has	 none	 of	 these	 (or	 if	 some,	
then	 only	 in	 small	 measure);	 Bolivian	 rural	 protest	 was	 broad-based,	 non-
vanguardist,	heavily	 influenced	by	 indigenous	groups	and	environmentalism,	and	
therefore	 quite	 ‘post-developmental’	 in	 tone;	 Nepal’s	 was	 explicitly	 Maoist,	
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vanguardist,	 and	 classist	 (led	 by	 educated	 Marxists	 schooled	 in	 the	 ‘orthodox’,	
technologically	 determinist	 variant	 of	 Marxism	 –	 see	 Bhattarai	 (2003),	 for	
example),	 with	 little	 reference	 to	 a	 ‘post-developmental’	 or	 an	 agroecological	
ethos	 (although	 indigenous	rights	 issues	have	comprised	a	significant	element	 in	
the	 Maoist	 uprising).	 In	 this,	 the	 Maoist	 movement	 was	 heavily	 and	 explicitly	
influenced	 by	 the	Maoist	 Sendero	 Luminoso	movement	 in	 Peru	 (Nickson	 1992).	
Additionally,	capitalist	relations	of	production	have	been	dominant	in	Bolivia	since	
the	modernizing	‘revolution’	of	1952,	while	Nepal	has	never	had	a	comprehensive	
programme	 of	 modernising,	 capitalist	 reform.	 Indeed,	 significant	 pre-capitalist	
and	feudal	social	relations	remain	 in	Nepal	 (Sugden	2013),	and,	far	from	being	a	
mere	 residue	 of	 the	 past,	 appear	 actually	 to	 be	 reinforced	 in	 the	 current	
conjuncture	 as	 a	 form	of	 ‘functional	 dualism’,	 delivering	 ‘super-profits’	 to	 those	
who	control	labour	power.	These	feudal	social	relations,	together	with	the	survival	
of	an	absolutist	monarchy,	are	amongst	the	important	predisposing	factors	behind	
the	 Maoist	 mobilization	 of	 the	 1990s,	 a	 mobilization	 that	 was	 to	 lead	 to	 the	
installation	 of	 full	 (representative)	 democratization	 in	 the	 following	 decade	 and	
the	inclusion	of	the	term	‘food	sovereignty’	in	Nepal’s	new	interim	constitution.		
The	 Maoist	 mobilization	 was,	 then,	 an	 explicitly	 class-based	 and	 vanguardist	
movement,	 led	 typically	 by	 newly	 educated	 local	 elites	 frustrated	 by	 lack	 of	
opportunities	for	advancement	in	a	system	ossified	by	an	absolute	monarchy,	by	
caste	 discrimination,	 and	 by	 an	 absence	 of	 democracy.	 The	Maoists	 deployed	 a	
discourse	 essentially	 of	 democratic	modernism,	 not	 of	 ‘post-developmentalism’,	
with	an	absence	of	concern	for	issues	of	agroecology	and	ecological	sustainability.	
‘Food	sovereignty’,	a	 term	not	 really	understood	and	adopted	uncritically	at	 the	
time	 of	 the	 2009	 Interim	 Constitution	 (Adhikari	 pers.	 comm),	 essentially	meant	
national	 food	 security,	 supported	 by	 the	 rather	 vague	 notion	 of	 ‘scientific	
agriculture’,	 implicitly	 comprising	 modern,	 intensive,	 productivist	 farming	
practices.	 So,	 Maoism	 is	 a	 discourse	 generated	 by	 the	 survival	 of	 semi-feudal	
relations	 of	 production,	 an	 absolutist	 monarchy,	 and	 consequently	 inadequate	
channels	through	which	a	growing	stratum	of	educated	local	elites	could	realize	its	
political	ambitions.	In	a	sense,	this	stratum	utilized	the	well-founded	grievances	of	
the	 ‘peasantry’	 and	 landless	 to	 achieve	 its	 own	 ends	 –	 that	 of	 political	
representation	and	power.	Once	(representative)	democracy	was	secured	in	2007	
and	the	interests	of	the	cadre	of	Maoists	relatively	satisfied	politically,	the	aims	of	
Maoism	 could	 be	 easily	 subverted	 by	 the	 capitalist	 reformism	 of	 the	 Nepali	
Congress	 Party.	 However,	 while	 these	 short-term	 ambitions	 of	 the	 Maoist	
vanguardists	have	been	satisfied,	the	structural	contradictions	of	rural	Nepal	that	
they	 purported	 to	 articulate,	most	 particularly	 poverty,	 exploitation,	 and	 highly	
unequal	 access	 to	 land,	 have	 only	 deepened	 since	 2007.	 Indeed,	 these	
contradictions	 have	 been	 compounded	 by	 declining	 yields,	 soil	 erosion,	 chronic	
lack	 of	 investment	 in	 farming,	 lack	 of	 national	 food	 security	 (let	 alone	
sovereignty),	 and	 by	 an	 almost	 complete	 absence	 of	 land	 reform.	 Thus,	 the	
transformation	 envisaged	 around	 a	 new	 agrarian	 future	 that	was	 central	 to	 the	
Maoist	movement	in	Nepal,	has	now	been	all	but	forgotten	(Sugden	pers	comm).	
In	short,	there	has	been	a	signal	failure	to	make	any	progress	at	all	towards	that	
nebulous	 (as	 far	 as	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 Nepalis	 are	 concerned)	 notion	 of	 food	
sovereignty.	The	agrarian	question	of	the	peasantry	and	food	sovereignty	in	Nepal	
remains,	therefore,	completely	unresolved.	
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Indeed,	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	Maoist	 war,	 a	 number	 of	 reactionary	 trends	 have	
been	evident.	The	rise	of	rightwing	populism	had	been	important	 in	Nepal	(as	 in	
many	 other	 countries),	 as	 a	 reactionary	 backlash	 by	 the	 comprador	 elite,	 who	
mobilize	peasants	around	issues	of	ethnic	majoritarianism	and	nativism	to	divert	
attention	 away	 from	 the	 national	 level	 failings	 in	 a	 dependent,	 import	 based	
economy	such	as	Nepal.	At	the	same	time	the	ethnic	counter	politics	often	linked	
to	 indigeneity	 has	 largely	 avoided	 issues	 of	 peasant	 politics	 focusing	 on	
representation	within	the	political	sphere	–	although	when	these	issues	do	surface	
it	 is	 linked	 to	 historical	 animosities	 surrounding	 much	 older	 relations	 of	
production	 –	 namely	 the	 abolition	 of	 communal	 land	 by	 the	 feudal	 state	 in	 the	
early	to	mid	20th	century.	This	raises	a	larger	issue	relating	again	to	pre-capitalist	
formations.	 In	Nepal,	 feudal	 land	ownership,	particularly	 in	 the	 lowlands,	and	 in	
some	parts	of	 the	hills,	 represents	a	competing	set	of	class	 interests	 to	 those	 in	
the	 capitalist	 sector.	 This	 has	 both	 affected	 peasant	 movements	 for	 food	
sovereignty	as	 the	primary	contradiction	 is	between	peasants	and	 landlords	and	
not	between	peasants	and	global	agri-business.	In	the	case	of	Nepal,	farm	exports	
are	actually	limited,	although	farmers	are	bonded	to	global	agri-business	through	
dependence	on	inputs.	Nevertheless,	the	left	movement	in	Nepal	has	underplayed	
internal	 pre-capitalist	 divisions	 and	overplayed	external	 role	 of	 imperialism,	 and	
this	 has	 perhaps	 made	 it	 more	 difficult	 to	 develop	 a	 broad-based	 peasant	
movement	in	the	post	(Maoist)	war	context	(Sugden	pers	comm).	
While	 the	 fundamental	 questions	 surrounding	 the	 agrarian	 question	 remain	
unresolved,	 the	 peasantry	 and	 landless,	 meanwhile,	 are	 obliged	 to	 devise	
livelihood	 survival	 strategies	 as	best	 they	 can.	 In	many	 instances,	 this	has	 taken	
the	form	of	the	remittance	economy,	seasonal	migration	abroad	to	Malaysia,	the	
Gulf	States,	South	Korea,	and	 India	to	work	on	construction	sites,	 industry,	or	 in	
agriculture.	 Some	 twenty-five	 per	 cent	 of	 Nepali	 GDP	 now	 derives	 from	
remittances	 from	overseas	work.	 This	 trend	has	been	encouraged	by	 successive	
Nepali	 governments	 as	 a	means	of	 relieving	pressure	 for	 internal	 reform,	whilst	
enabling	semi-proletarians	to	eke	out	livings	from	their	tiny	plots	of	land	by	means	
of	 the	 remittance	 supplement.	 The	 remittance	 economy,	 together	 with	 the	
country’s	heavy	dependency	on	international	aid,	has	enabled	the	Nepali	state	to	
do	little	or	nothing	to	address	the	underlying	causes	of	crisis,	social	and	ecological,	
that	 derive	 from	 the	 unresolved	 agrarian	 question.	 These	 twin	 crises	will	 surely	
engulf	 the	 country	 as	 the	 remittance	 economy	 falters,	 however,	 and	 the	
contradictions	 are	 again	 ‘internalized’	 within	 the	 bounds	 of	 the	 state.	 Thrown	
back	 on	 its	 own	 resources,	 it	 is	 at	 this	 point	 that	 Nepali	 state	 (as	 the	 social	
relational	condensation	of	class	interests)	will	again	need	to	confront	the	agrarian	
question,	 either	 of	 its	 own	 volition,	 or	 through	 compulsion	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	
renewed	social	upheaval.	
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